This Week in the Supreme Court – week commencing 30th January 2023

Hearings in the Supreme Court are now shown live on the Court’s website.

On Monday 30th and Tuesday 31st January 2023 the Court will hear Jones v Birmingham City Council and another, on appeal from [2018] EWCA 1189. The issue in this case is whether Part 4 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 is incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2016 an interim injunction was granted preventing the appellant from entering a large part of central Birmingham, save for exceptional circumstances, on account of his alleged involvement in gang-related activities.

On Wednesday 1st February 2023 the Court will hand down judgment in Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2023] UKSC 4. The Court will determine whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to hold that the claimants were entitled to a remedy in the tort of private nuisance by reason of the Tate Modern’s use of the top floor of its Blavatnik Building as a viewing platform. The hand down will take place at 09:45 in Courtroom One.

On Wednesday 1st and Thursday 2nd February 2023 the Court will hear the case of Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC, on appeal from [2022] EWCA 318. The Court will consider the following issues:

Does the Quincecare duty have any application in a case where the relevant payment instruction was not issued to the bank by an agent of the bank’s customer?
If not, should either (i) the Quincecare duty be extended so as to include the obligations contended for by Mrs Philipp in relation to authorised push payment fraud, or (ii) the law recognise or impose such obligations on a paying bank as incidents of its duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in and about executing an instruction?
Should the Court determine issues 1 and/or 2 above on a summary judgment and/or strike-out application?

The following Supreme Court judgments remain outstanding: (As of 03/02/23)

The Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc v Ukraine (Represented by the Minister of Finance of Ukraine acting upon the instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) Nos. 2 and 3, heard 9-12 December 2019
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Flowers and Ors, heard 22 June 2021
Canada Square Operations Ltd v Potter, heard 14th June 2022
R (on the application of VIP Communications Ltd (In Liquidation)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, heard 4th October 2022
Unger and another (in substitution for Hasan) v Ul-Hasan (deceased) and another, heard 20th October 2022
Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and another v Agnew and others (Northern Ireland), heard 14th-15th December 2022
Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland, heard 12th January 2023
Moulsdale t/a Moulsdale Properties v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Scotland), heard 17th January 2023
Republic of Mozambique (acting through its Attorney General) v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and others, heard 24-25th January 2023
Rakusen v Jepson and others, heard 26th January 2023.
Jones v Birmingham City Council and another, heard 30th-31st January 2023.
Philipp v Barclays Bank UK PLC, heard 1st-2nd February 2023.

Case Preview: Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and Ors

In this post, Eilidh Douglas, Senior Associate in the ICE Disputes team at CMS, previews the case of Republic of Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and Ors, which was heard by the UK Supreme Court on 24 and 25 January 2023.

Factual Background

The appellant is the Republic of Mozambique (“the Republic”). The case relates to the development of the Republic’s economy and in particular, the opportunities afforded by its coastline and territorial waters for tuna fishing and gas exploitation.

Through three special purpose vehicles (the “SPVs”) wholly owned by the Republic, it entered into three contracts (the “Contracts”) with Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL and related companies (the “Privinvest Defendants”) for the supply of various vessels and associated shipping infrastructure. The SPVs borrowed the purchase funds for the Contracts, and the Republic granted sovereign guarantees (the “Guarantees”) over the borrowing. The Contracts are each governed by Swiss law and contain an arbitration agreement. The Guarantees, meanwhile, are governed by English law and provide for disputes to be resolved by the English courts.

In what came to be known as the “Tuna Bond Scandal”, the Republic alleged that the Privinvest Defendants and related individuals had bribed corrupt officials to the tune of at least $143 million. The alleged corruption, in turn, exposed the Republic to potential liability under the Guarantees. The Republic commenced an action against the Privinvest Defendants in the English courts. However, the Privinvest Defendants sought a stay of that action, on the basis that the subject-matter of the action was a matter properly to be decided by arbitration pursuant to the Contracts’ arbitration agreements.

Appellate History

In February 2019, the Republic commenced proceedings against the Privinvest Defendants in England in respect of the alleged bribery and corruption. Meanwhile, Privinvest commenced arbitration against the SPVs and the Republic in Switzerland pursuant to the arbitration agreements in the Contracts (although the Republic was not a signatory, Privinvest argued that as a matter of Swiss law the Republic was nevertheless deemed a party to the Contracts).

In November 2019, the Privinvest Defendants sought a stay of the English proceedings, pursuant to Arbitration Act 1996, s 9, which provides at ss (1) that:

A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are brought (whether by way of claim or counterclaim) in respect of a matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to the other parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter.

At first instance, the High Court [2020] EWHC 2012 (Comm) held that the claims in the English proceedings were not matters falling within the scope of the arbitration agreements in the Contracts. The claims in respect of bribery and corruption were not “sufficiently connected” with the Contracts and the remedies sought were not concerned with the purchase prices under the Contracts.

The Privinvest Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal [2021] EWCA Civ 329, which overturned the decision of the High Court. The Court of Appeal noted (at paragraph 63) that a ““matter” is not the same as a cause of action; it includes any issue capable of constituting a dispute under the relevant arbitration agreement.” This included potential defences. The English proceedings would necessarily (in the context of the Privinvest Defendants’ defence that the Contracts were genuine commercial transactions) consider the validity of the Contracts; this was a “matter” referrable to arbitration under the arbitration agreements. The Republic’s claims against the Privinvest Defendants therefore fell within the scope of the arbitration agreements.

The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court and the case was heard by the Supreme Court on 24 and 25 January 2023.

Comment

This appellate history of this case illustrates differing approaches to interpretation of the Arbitration Act 1996, s 9, and whether proceedings “concern” a “matter”in respect of” which an arbitration agreement applies. A narrow approach such as that adopted by the High Court has the potential to impact the sanctity of parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes; a broad approach such as that adopted by the Court of Appeal, meanwhile, may produce “unwelcome case management complications” for English proceedings where parts of a claim falling within an arbitration agreement are to be stayed. The Supreme Court’s decision will, it is hoped, provide clarity as to the correct approach.

New Judgment: Barton and others v Morris and another in place of Gwyn-Jones (deceased) [2022] UKSC 3

On appeal from: [2019] EWCA Civ 1999

Foxpace Limited (“Foxpace”), the Fourth Respondent, owned a property known as Nash House in London. This appeal concerns an oral agreement between Foxpace and Mr Barton, the First Respondent, about Nash House. In the High Court it was held that Foxpace agreed to pay Mr Barton £1.2 million if he introduced a purchaser for Nash House who bought it for £6.5 million. The £1.2 million represented deposits and other expenses that Mr Barton had lost on two previous attempts to buy Nash House.

Mr Barton introduced to Foxpace a purchaser who attempted to buy Nash House for £6.55 million. However, it came to light that Nash House fell within an area safeguarded for the purpose of the construction of the HS2 rail link. As a result, Western acquired Nash House for £6 million plus VAT. Since the oral contract between Foxpace and Mr Barton made no provision as to what would happen if Nash House was sold for anything less than £6.5 million, Foxpace argued there was no contractual obligation to pay anything to Mr Barton. Accordingly, Mr Barton brought a claim for the reasonable value of his services.

The first instance judge held that Mr Barton was not entitled to any payment. In case he was wrong, the judge assessed a reasonable fee for Mr Barton’s services as being £435,000. The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Barton’s appeal and held that he was entitled to a reasonable fee. The Appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.

 

HELD – Appeal allowed, by a 3-2 majority.

 

Foxpace could be contractually bound to pay a fee to Mr Barton in three different ways: (1) an express term; (2) a term implied on the facts; and (3) a term implied by law. Alternatively, Foxpace could be obliged to pay a fee to Mr Barton under the law of unjust enrichment. The majority held that none of these avenues leads to the conclusion that Mr Barton should be paid a fee.

 

The express terms of the contract

There was no express contractual term creating an obligation on Foxpace to pay Mr Barton a fee if Nash House was sold to Western for less than £6.5 million.

 

A term implied as a matter of fact

The majority hold that implying a term that Foxpace is contractually bound to pay Mr Barton an unspecified sum if a purchaser buys Nash House for less than £6.5 million contradicts the express terms of the contract. It was not possible to say that there is any particular fee to which the parties would clearly have agreed, or which is so obvious that it goes without saying.

 

A term implied as a matter of law

Section 15 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 implies a term that the party contracting with the supplier for services will pay a reasonable charge where consideration for the service is not determined by the contract. The majority hold that this section does not apply in the circumstances of this case because consideration was in fact determined by the contract.

The law also implies a term as an incident of the particular kind of contract in issue. Mr Barton relied on a series of cases in which the courts have implied an entitlement to commission as an incident of informal contracts commonly entered into between sellers of property and estate agents when the property is sold to a purchaser introduced by the estate agent. The majority held that Mr Barton’s contract is not the same as the contracts in those cases.

 

The claim in unjust enrichment

The majority held that Mr Barton’s claim in unjust enrichment also failed. An obligation on Foxpace to pay any commission to Mr Barton when there has been no sale to Western for £6.5 million is at odds with what was agreed and the law of unjust enrichment cannot be relied on to circumvent the terms of a subsisting contract.

 

Dissenting judgments

Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows dissent and would both dismiss the appeal. Lord Leggatt holds that Mr Barton was entitled to a reasonable remuneration under a term, implied by law, to pay a reasonable sum for the supply of services where no sum is fixed by the contract. He holds that this entitlement to reasonable remuneration is not inconsistent with the inference that, if Nash House sold for less than £6.5 million, Foxpace would not be obliged to pay Mr Barton £1.2 million. Lord Leggatt also holds that the law of unjust enrichment does not assist Mr Barton’s claim.

Lord Burrows holds that there was a term implied by law into the contract that Mr Barton would be paid reasonable remuneration by Foxpace if he successfully introduced the buyer of Nash House to Foxpace. He holds that the express terms of the contract, for payment of £1.2 million if the purchase price of Nash House was £6.5 million, did not exclude this implied term. Lord Burrows also holds that had there been no such implied term, the same result would have been reached in the law of unjust enrichment.

To read the Judgment, please see:

Judgment (PDF)
Judgment on The National Archives (HTML version)
Judgment on BAILII (HTML version)

For the Press Summary, please see:

Press summary (HTML version)

To watch the hearing, please see:

Watch hearing

2 November 2022
Morning session
Afternoon session

Case Preview: Rakusen v Jepson and Ors

In this post, Luke Arnold, Associate in the Real Estate team at CMS, previews the case of Rakusen v Jepson and Ors, which is due to be heard by the UK Supreme Court on 26 January 2023.

Factual Background

The respondent in this appeal, Mr Rakusen, is the leasehold owner of a flat in North London. In 2016, he granted a tenancy of the flat to Kensington Property Investment Group (“Kensington”) which permitted the subletting of individual rooms in the flat. Kensington later entered into separate agreements with the Appellants (Jepson and Ors) granting them each possession of one room.

Both parties accept that by November 2018 the flat was occupied by more than three people forming two or more households and, therefore, constituted a house in multiple occupation which required a licence under the Housing Act 2004. However, neither the respondent nor Kensington applied for a licence in breach of this Act.

The Housing and Planning Act 2016, s 40(1) (“the 2016 Act”) confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order (“RRO”) where a landlord has committed specific housing offences, which include the “control or management of unlicenced HMO”. The 2016 Act does not however define ‘landlord’, which leaves some ambiguity as to whether a tenant can only apply for a RRO against its immediate landlord or, alternatively, against a superior landlord which may be a more financially viable target.

Appellate History

In September 2019 the Appellants applied to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) under s 41 of the 2016 Act for a RRO totalling £26,140 against the Respondent and his partner, who is a joint leasehold owner of the flat. As detailed above, the Respondent is the Appellants’ superior landlord.

The respondent and his partner invited the First-tier Tribunal to strike out the whole of the application on the basis that a RRO could only be made against Kensington, i.e. the Appellants’ immediate landlord, and therefore there was no reasonable prospect of the application succeeding.

While the Tribunal agreed to strike out the claim against the Respondent’s partner (on the basis she was not a named party to the tenancy agreement with Kensington), it refused to do so against the Respondent. It considered it was bound by the earlier decision of the Upper Tribunal in Goldsbrough v CA Property Management Ltd [2019] UKUT 311 (LC) in which it was held that a RRO could be made against a superior landlord. It considered that the Respondent was ‘a’ landlord of the flat, even if he was not ‘the’ landlord of the Appellants and therefore was subject to s 41 of the 2016 Act.

The Respondent appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) ([2020] UKUT 298 (LC)) which analysed the construction of the 2016 Act and upheld both Goldsbrough and the first instance decision. It concluded that the First-tier Tribunal has jurisdiction to make a RRO against any landlord who has committed a housing offence, including superior landlords.

The Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal ([2021] EWCA Civ 1150) which allowed the appeal. The court disagreed with the statutory interpretation carried out by the Upper Tribunal and considered it departed from the natural meaning of the legislation, especially as the outcome would otherwise be that a superior landlord could be ordered to ‘repay’ tenants sums of money which they never received in the first place.

The Appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.

Comment

The Supreme Court decision will have a significant impact on the scope and effectiveness of RROs and, by extension, a tenant’s ability to take action against landlords. This case is particularly timely as the increasing number of financially unsound ‘rent to rent’ companies has created difficulties for tenants and local authorities when trying to take legal action to recover unlawfully demanded rent. However, while the very purpose of the 2016 Act is to protect tenants, the Court of Appeal was keen to emphasise that the court must interpret the statute as it presently stands and should leave it to Parliament to further legislate if appropriate to combat the ‘significant social evil’ of rogue landlords.

Clarification on this issue will be eagerly awaited by tenants and, perhaps, with some trepidation by landlords. Either way, this decision is likely to have wide-reaching and significant consequences for landlords and tenants across the country.

This Week in the Supreme Court – week commencing 23rd January 2023

Hearings in the Supreme Court are now shown live on the Court’s website.

On Tuesday 24th and Wednesday 25th January 2023, the court will hear the case of Republic of Mozambique (acting through its Attorney General) v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and others. The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeal erred in its approach to section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in finding that one of Mozambique’s claims were ‘matters’ outside the scope of the relevant arbitration agreements, when giving judgment at [2021] EWCA 329.

Also on Wednesday, the Court will hand down judgment in Barton and others v Morris and another in place of Gwyn–Jones (deceased), first heard on the 2nd November 2022. The Court will decide whether sellers have an obligation to pay reasonable renumeration to an introducer in circumstances where an oral contract provides for an introduction fee payable upon the sale of a property for an amount that was less than the specified conditional amount. Hand-down is at 09:45.

On Thursday 26th January, the court will hear Rakusen v Jepson and others, on appeal from [2021] EWCA Civ 1150. The court will consider the question: can a Rent Repayment Order only be made against an immediate landlord or can a superior landlord also be liable?

The following Supreme Court judgments remain outstanding: (As of 26/1/23)

The Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc v Ukraine (Represented by the Minister of Finance of Ukraine acting upon the instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) Nos. 2 and 3, heard 9-12 December 2019
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Flowers and Ors, heard 22 June 2021
Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery, heard 7th December 2021
Canada Square Operations Ltd v Potter, heard 14th June 2022
R (on the application of VIP Communications Ltd (In Liquidation)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, heard 4th October 2022
Unger and another (in substitution for Hasan) v Ul-Hasan (deceased) and another, heard 20th October 2022
Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and another v Agnew and others (Northern Ireland), heard 14th-15th December 2022
Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland, heard 12th January 2023
Moulsdale t/a Moulsdale Properties v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Scotland), heard 17th January 2023
Republic of Mozambique (acting through its Attorney General) v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL (Holding) and others, heard 24-25th January 2023

Rakusen v Jepson and others, heard 26th January 2023.

Case Comment: R v Maughan (Northern Ireland) [2022] UKSC 13

In this post, Ross Ludlow, Legal Support Assistant at Matrix Chambers, comments on the case of R v Maughan (Northern Ireland) [2022] UKSC 13. This case considered the Northern Irish approach to reduction in sentence for defendants who plead guilty to offences at an early stage of proceedings.

The Supreme Court was asked to consider two sentencing policies – firstly, that the stage at which the defendant indicates their intention to plead guilty is important, in that in order to be entitled to the maximum discount they must plead guilty at the earliest opportunity, and secondly, that the reduction should not be as great in cases where those defendants were caught ‘red-handed’.

Facts

The appellant and his brother were apprehended by police whilst fleeing in a stolen car containing a range of items that they had also stolen in a burglary earlier that day in Newcastle, County Down. Further enquiries ‘established compelling evidence including CCTV that in the previous three days the appellant and his brother had attempted to burgle’ and succeeded in the burgling of other properties.

Following his arrest, the appellant refused to leave his cell or to be interviewed by the police. He did not accept responsibility for any of the matters at hand. He was subsequently charged and brought before the Magistrates’ Court on the 26th of July 2016. He pleaded guilty at arraignment on the 14th of September 2016 to the charges which are the subject of this appeal. He had given no prior indication of an intention to plead guilty.

Judgments Below

The appellant was sentenced on the 21st of December 2016. The sentencing judge held that the appellant was entitled to a reduced discount to his sentence because he (i) failed to accept responsibility for his offending behaviour at interview or indicate an intention to plead guilty at any stage prior to arraignment and (ii) was caught red handed in respect of some of the offences.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, who dismissed the appeal but not without concluding that the sentencing policy on early admission ‘was more nuanced than described by the trial judge’. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Judgment of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The court considered the lawfulness of each of the sentencing policies in turn: referred to as the ‘earliest opportunity maximum reduction’ policy and the ‘reduction in discount when caught red-handed’ policy.

Underpinning the consideration of both policies was the fact that the administration of justice is a devolved responsibility in Northern Ireland, and that sentencing policy is largely set by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. The Supreme Court recognised that the NI Court of Appeal was best placed to assess what policy changes were appropriate on account of the increased number of cases that it hears. The Supreme Court’s task was therefore not to comment generally on sentencing policies in Northern Ireland, but to decide whether or not the Court of Appeal had made an error of law on the facts of this case according to those policies.

(1) Earliest opportunity maximum reduction

Article 33 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 states that the court shall take into account the ‘stage in proceedings’ at which the defendant indicated their intention to plead guilty. The appellant argued that “proceedings” within the meaning of Article 33 did not include any stage prior to arraignment because in the Northern Irish criminal justice system, which still requires committal for trial, that was the first time the defendant was required to indicate whether they pleaded guilty. The appellant argued that the offender’s failure to admit wrongdoing prior to arraignment should therefore not be treated as relevant to the sentencing discount.

After reviewing case law on the definition of ‘criminal proceedings’ (most notably Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68), a report by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and various statutory provisions, the Supreme Court held that “proceedings” within the meaning of Article 33 did not include the investigative process prior to charge or the issue of a summons. Crucially, it noted that:

“The term “proceedings for the offence” in article 33 contemplates an offence in respect of which proceedings have been issued. The police investigation by way of questioning is concerned with confirming or dispelling a suspicion that an offence has been committed. The offence which is the subject of proceedings only crystallises at the moment of charge, summons or, unusually, presentation of an indictment, in other words after the police interview.” [37]

The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland is therefore entitled to adopt a sentencing policy which treats as relevant to the sentencing discount the failure to admit wrongdoing during interview, but the interview itself is not a part of ‘criminal proceedings’ (and so the impact on the discount is not automatic). The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland made no error of law.

(2) Reduction in discount when caught red handed

The Supreme Court held that a reduction in discount where the offender has been caught red handed has long been recognised as a feature of sentencing practice throughout the United Kingdom. The purpose of the discount is to encourage guilty pleas to obtain the utilitarian benefits of saving time, cost, and providing reassurance for witnesses and victims.

However, where the prosecution case is overwhelming, the offender may be left with little realistic choice but to plead guilty. Such an offender might not deserve the same level of encouragement to plead guilty.

Although in England and Wales and in Scotland sentencing policy has changed in recent years so that full discount for an early plea is now given in cases where the offender has been caught red handed, this is not the case in Northern Ireland. That fact alone does not render unlawful the different policy adopted by the Northern Ireland courts, and there was nothing unlawful in applying a reduced discount in such circumstances.

Comment

The principal reasoning behind the court’s judgment is that sentencing policy in Northern Ireland is a matter for the Northern Irish courts, specifically the Court of Appeal. Northern Irish courts are not bound to follow the sentencing policies of England and Wales or Scotland.

Encouraging an early guilty plea is beneficial in terms of saving limited resources such as time and public funds, but more importantly saving witnesses and victims from the anxiety of testifying in what could be a lengthy trial; one which might not be for many months or years after the offence. An offender pleading guilty expedites justice, which is one of the overriding objectives of a criminal justice system.

However, caution ought to be exercised when considering the ‘earliest opportunity’ and the weight afforded to the interview before proceedings begin. In this particular case, the offender had been caught red-handed and knew very well the strength of the case against him even before the police interview. In other cases, the accused may not even be aware of the accusations against them until the interview itself. Offenders ought not to be punished for failing to admit wrongdoing until they were aware of the full case against them, and the evidence on which it was based. The stage at which this happens is fact specific and varies from case to case, and it is sensible that the wording in the judgment is only that failing to admit wrongdoing before proceedings is to be treated as ‘relevant’. This leaves room for discretion to be exercised on a case by case basis.

The decision on the first of the two policies is therefore a welcome one. Whilst failure to admit wrongdoing in interview is to be treated as ‘relevant’, this does not automatically mean that it will always prevent the full discount. A sensible balance is struck between encouraging offenders to admit wrongdoing as early as possible where the case against them is obvious (as in this case) whilst not automatically penalising those in other cases who are not aware of the full case against them until ‘proceedings’ begin.

It is sensible that Northern Irish Courts are free to employ their own sentencing policies. It was not the place of the Supreme Court to comment on the merits of the policy whereby those caught red-handed were entitled to a reduced discount; only to confirm that it was lawful for them to follow such a policy. Given that the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland sees far more criminal cases than the Supreme Court, it best placed to identify which policies would be most appropriate in Northern Ireland.

Conclusion

It is worth noting that a review in 2019[1] into sentencing in Northern Ireland concluded that it would be desirable to have a clear understanding of the principles and purposes of sentencing in Northern Ireland, and criticised the then ‘piecemeal’ approach for impeding transparency and contributing to undermining public trust in the justice system. This led to the passing of the Judicial Council Act 2019 which sought to clarify sentencing policy in Northern Ireland. Whatever the merits of the sentencing policies themselves, the judgment in Maughan can be therefore be welcomed as one which provides certainty as to their scope, and to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland as the body with the prerogative to decide them.

[1] Department of Justice NI, ‘Sentencing Review: Northern Ireland. A Public Consultation’ (October 2019)

Case Comment: DCM (Optical Holdings) Ltd v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2022] UKSC 26

In this post, Neal Chandru, an Associate in the Tax team at CMS, comments on the case of DCM (Optical Holdings) Ltd (“DCM”) v Commissioners for his Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) [2022] UKSC 26 – handed down on 12 October 2022.

The issues on appeal before the Supreme Court were whether HMRC:

were, on the facts of the case, constrained by the statutory time bar in s 73(6) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (”VATA”); and
can deny a self-assessment claim for payment of a VAT credit while HMRC validates the claim.

The background facts which gave rise to these issues are set out in more detail in the UKSC Blog post previewing this decision.  For present purposes, the background facts can be summarised as follows.

Background Facts

DCM is an optician that makes taxable and exempt supplies of medical services. In 2003, DCM entered into a settlement agreement with HMRC under which it agreed that 64 per cent of its supplies were exempt and the remainder taxable. In early 2004, HMRC told DCM that it had to use a full cost apportionment methodology of apportioning the consideration paid by customers between taxable and exempt supplies until a different separately disclosed charges methodology could be agreed with HMRC.

In the relevant periods, contrary to the settlement agreement, DCM treated 70 per cent of its supplies as exempt and the remainder as taxable. It also failed to use the full cost apportionment methodology HMRC said it needed to use.

The First Issue

VATA, s 73(6)(b) provides that:

An assessment under subsection (1), (2) or (3) above of an amount of VAT due for any prescribed accounting period must be made within the time limits provided for in section 77 and shall not be made after the later of the following-

one year after evidence of facts, sufficient in the opinion of the Commissioners to justify the making of the assessment, comes to their knowledge

DCM argued that HMRC knew from 29 January 2004 that DCM had not been using a full cost apportionment methodology to calculate the split between exempt and taxable supplies and that it was not adopting a 36:64 split between taxable and exempt supplies. Accordingly, pursuant to VATA, s 73(6)(b), 29 January 2005 was the last date on which HMRC’s assessments could be raised. As the assessments were raised on 20 October 2005, DCM argued that they were made out of time.

The Second Issue

In relation to the second issue, DCM argued that HMRC is required to pay a taxpayer VAT credits claimed by the taxpayer without first validating the claim; and HMRC has no power to pay an amount less than what the taxpayer claims in its self-assessment.

DCM argued that these requirements are grounded in VATA, s 25(3), which provides:

If either no output tax is due at the end of the period, or the amount of the credit exceeds that of the output tax then … the amount of the credit or, as the case may be, the amount of the excess shall be paid to the taxable person by the Commissioners; and an amount which is due under this subsection is referred to in this Act as a ‘VAT credit’.”

Conclusions on the Issues

The First Issue

The Supreme Court stated that VATA, s 73(6)(b), refers to the assessment that HMRC has actually made rather than a hypothetical assessment. This follows from the words “the assessment” in the subsection:

“one year after evidence of facts, sufficient in the opinion of the Commissioners to justify the making of the assessment”

[emphasis added]

In the Supreme Court’s view, HMRC did not have sufficient evidence to make the 20 October 2005 assessment until it gained access for the first time to DCM’s VAT account during a visit to DCM’s premises on 31 August and 1 September 2005. Accordingly, the 20 October 2005 assessment was not out of time.

The Second Issue

The Supreme Court acknowledged that HMRC does not have an express power to refuse to pay a VAT credit to a taxpayer while it verifies the claim for that credit. However, the Supreme Court held that this power arises by implication. The Supreme Court’s reasons for finding this implication included the following.

First, the obligation in VATA, s 25(3) for HMRC to pay a VAT credit only arises once it is established that a VAT credit is in fact due. On that basis, the obligation on HMRC to pay the credit does not inevitably follow from the taxpayer’s claim for a credit.

Second, under VATA, Sch 11, para 1, HMRC are under a statutory duty “for the collection and management of VAT”.  It is implicit from this duty that HMRC has the power to refuse to pay a taxpayer a VAT credit not due to it.

Third, on the basis of fiscal neutrality, HMRC is tasked with verifying a taxpayers repayment claim.  Otherwise, taxpayers who regularly claim VAT credits from HMRC would have an unjustified cash flow advantage compared to taxpayers who pay a net sum to HMRC.

Comment

The Supreme Court’s decision in DCM importantly establishes that:

the time bar in VATA, s 73(6)(b), does not begin to run until HMRC has the last piece of evidence that justifies the making of the assessment that HMRC actually makes; and
HMRC has an implied statutory power to refuse to pay a VAT credit to a taxpayer.

DCM represents a victory for HMRC.  However, the conclusions on the first and second issues need not cause taxpayers excessive concern.  The Supreme Court’s construction of VATA, s 73(6)(b), does not allow HMRC to raise assessments excessively out of time as VATA, s 77, prohibits the making of assessments for the relevant accounting period after a particular period of years. The period of years is currently four.

In relation to the second issue, it must be said that DCM’s argument here was ambitious. It is difficult to see how the VAT regime could work if HMRC were obliged to pay VAT credits to a taxpayer simply because they claimed to be entitled to the credit.  On that basis, it is unsurprising that DCM did not succeed on this issue.

New Judgment: Sara & Hossein Asset Holdings Ltd (a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands) v Blacks Outdoor Retail Ltd [2023] UKSC 2

On appeal from [2020] EWCA Civ 1521

The Appellant (“Blacks”) rented commercial retail premises from the Respondent (“S&H”) under two successive leases dated 2013 and 2018 (the “leases”). The leases stated that S&H as landlord should provide a certificate each year “as to the amount of the total cost and the sum payable by the tenant” and that this was to be “conclusive” in the absence of “manifest or mathematical error or fraud” (the “certification provision”). Blacks refused to pay the service charge for the years 2017-18 and 2018-19, claiming that the service charge was excessive. S&H issued proceedings and sought summary judgment for the outstanding service charge, arguing that under the certification provision S&H’s certificate as to the sum payable was conclusive subject only to the defences that there had been a manifest error, a mathematical error or fraud (the “permitted defences”). Blacks argued that the true meaning of the certification provision was that S&H’s certificate was conclusive as to the amount of costs incurred by the landlord, but not as to Blacks’ liability for service charge. S&H’s application for summary judgment was dismissed by a Deputy Master in the High Court. A Deputy Judge of the High Court dismissed S&H’s first appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed S&H’s second appeal and entered summary judgment in S&H’s favour, remitting to the High Court the question of what, if any, counterclaims Blacks could pursue.

 

Held – Appeal dismissed in part. By a majority the Supreme Court dismissed Blacks’ appeal against the grant of summary judgment but held that this does not preclude Blacks from pursuing a counterclaim in the High Court in relation to its underlying liability for the disputed service charge payments. Lord Hamblen gave the lead judgment with which the majority agree. Lord Briggs gave a dissenting judgment.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that neither party’s proposed interpretation of the certification provision was satisfactory.

S&H’s case is that its certificate is conclusive as to Blacks’ service charge liability, subject only to the permitted defences. Whilst that fits well with the wording of the certification provision, it is inconsistent with other provisions of the leases. Under the leases, the amount of service charge payable depends partly on the proportion of the overall premises that the tenant rents under the agreement. The leases contain a detailed dispute mechanism in relation to the assessment of that proportion, which may alter the amount payable by the tenant (the “proportion adjustment”). The certificate cannot, therefore, be entirely conclusive as to the sum payable by Blacks. S&H’s interpretation also does not fit well with Blacks’ rights to inspect S&H’s receipts, invoices and other evidence relating to the service charge for up to 12 months after the certificate is provided.

There are, moreover, many potentially arguable issues which may arise as to liability for service charge under the leases. The permitted defences are narrow and do not include an arguable error, however well founded the allegation of error may ultimately prove to be. It would be surprising for the parties to agree that arguable issues as to liability could be determined conclusively by the landlord, as judge in his own cause, without any opportunity for the tenant to challenge the determination.

Blacks’ case is that the certificate is conclusive only as to the landlord’s costs and not as to the sum payable by the tenant. However, this interpretation contradicts the natural and ordinary meaning of the certification provision that the certificate is conclusive both as to the “amount of the total cost” and “the sum payable by the tenant”. There is also force in S&H’s submission that allowing Blacks to challenge payment of the service charge undermines the commercial purpose of enabling the landlord to recover costs and expenses with minimal delay and dispute.

The majority finds that there is an alternative interpretation that avoids these difficulties. That interpretation is that S&H’s certificate is conclusive as to what is required to be paid by Blacks following certification, subject only to the permitted defences. S&H is thereby assured of payment of the service charge without protracted delay or dispute. However, payment of the certified sum does not preclude Blacks from later disputing liability for that payment. This gives full effect to Blacks’ inspection rights and entitles Blacks to pursue arguable claims as to service charge liability. Adopting an iterative approach, this interpretation is consistent with the contractual wording, it enables all the provisions of the leases to fit and work together satisfactorily and it avoids surprising implications and uncommercial consequences.

The majority therefore dismissed the appeal but held that this does not preclude Blacks from pursuing its counterclaim.

Lord Briggs dissented. In his view, the structure of the service charge regime in the leases and the ordinary meaning of the words used are irreconcilable with the majority’s judgment. There is no reason why the provision for a dispute mechanism in relation to proportion adjustment should mean that the landlord’s certificate is not conclusive as to all other aspects of the tenant’s service charge liability. Blacks’ inspection rights provide it with reasonable access to relevant documents in order to identify manifest errors, mathematical errors or fraud. The existence of those rights does not indicate that S&H’s certificate is not conclusive as to service charge liability. Service charge disputes commonly result in complex and costly litigation. It is not uncommercial that S&H should have insisted on limiting the available grounds for litigation to the permitted defences. Lord Briggs would therefore have accepted S&H’s proposed interpretation of the certification provision.

To read the judgment, please see:

Judgment (PDF)
Judgment on The National Archives (HTML version)
Judgment on BAILII (HTML version)

To read the Press Summary, please see:

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To watch the hearing, please see:

Watch hearing

8 November 2022
Morning session
Afternoon session

 

This Week in the Supreme Court – week commencing 16th January 2023

Hearings in the Supreme Court are now shown live on the Court’s website.

On Wednesday 18th January the Court will heard the case of Moulsdale t/a Moulsdale Properties v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Scotland), on appeal from [2021] CSIH 29. The appeal concerns whether the taxpayer’s sale of certain property was a supply exempt from value added tax (“VAT”). More specifically, whether the taxpayer intended or expected that the property sold was or would be a capital item in the hands of the purchaser under Schedule 10 of the VAT Act 1994, resulting in the taxpayer’s option to tax being disapplied. The hearing will begin at 10:30 in Courtroom 2.

On Thursday 19th January the Court will hand-down judgment in Sara & Hossein Asset Holdings Ltd (a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands) v Blacks Outdoor Retail Ltd [2023] UKSC 2, on appeal from [2020] EWCA Civ 1521. The key issue is whether the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of a provision in a commercial lease concerning service charges. The hand-down will take place at 9:45 am in Courtroom 2.

The following Supreme Court judgments remain outstanding: (As of 20/01/23)

The Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc v Ukraine (Represented by the Minister of Finance of Ukraine acting upon the instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) Nos. 2 and 3, heard 9-12 December 2019
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Flowers and Ors, heard 22 June 2021
Fearn and others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery, heard 7th December 2021
Canada Square Operations Ltd v Potter, heard 14th June 2022
R (on the application of VIP Communications Ltd (In Liquidation)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, heard 4th October 2022
Unger and another (in substitution for Hasan) v Ul-Hasan (deceased) and another, heard 20th October 2022
Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and another v Agnew and others (Northern Ireland), heard 14th-15th December 2022
Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland, heard 12th January 2023
Moulsdale t/a Moulsdale Properties v Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Scotland), heard 17th January 2023

New Judgment: McCue (as guardian for Andrew McCue)(AP) v Glasgow City Council (Scotland) [2023] UKSC 1

On appeal from [2020] CSIH 51

This appeal is concerned with the provision of community care services to disabled persons pursuant to the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (the “1968 Act”) and the charges made for such provision.

The appellant is acting as guardian for her son. At the time of the hearing, Mr McCue was 27 years old. He has Down’s Syndrome and lives with his parents. He is disabled within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act. As a result of his disability, he is provided with community care services by the respondent, Glasgow City Council (the “Council”). Under section 87 of the 1968 Act, the Council has assessed Mr McCue’s means and levied charges for the community care services provided to him, taking into account the appellant’s means and making corresponding deductions in the amount charged. Over several years, the appellant made representations to the Council that higher amounts should be deducted, but the Council was not persuaded by these representations. In these proceedings, the appellant claims that by failing to make greater deductions for disability related expenditure, the Council unlawfully discriminated against Mr McCue on grounds of his disability, within the meaning of section 15 of the Equality Act. She also submits that the Council acted in breach of its duty under section 20 of the Equality Act, which requires it to make reasonable adjustments to take account of Mr McCue’s disability. The claim was dismissed at first instance and the Inner House of the Court of Session dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.

Appeal unanimously dismissed.

The operation of section 87 of the 1968 Act: levying of a charge for community care services

Where a local authority provides services under the 1968 Act, then by virtue of section 87(1) it has a discretion whether to charge the recipient for those services and at what level any charge should be set. By virtue of section 87(1A), if the individual satisfies the authority that his means “are insufficient for it to be reasonably practicable for him to pay” the amount which would otherwise be due, then the authority may not charge more “than it appears to them that it is practicable for him to pay”. The onus is on the individual to satisfy the local authority that his means are insufficient to the extent that it is not “practicable” for him to pay.

The relevant question under section 87 is whether the Council is satisfied that Mr McCue has shown that his means are insufficient for it to be reasonably practicable for him to pay without deductions.

In relation to the disputed items of disability related expenditure, the Council’s assessment under section 87 was that they had not affected his means in such a way that would reduce what was practicable for him to pay by way of charges. The Council had properly applied section 87(1) and (1A).

 

Section 15 of the Equality Act: unfavourable treatment

The principal question here was whether the Council had treated Mr McCue “unfavourably” because of something arising in consequence of his disability, within the meaning of section 15(1)(a) of the Equality Act.

A comparison is required between two states of affairs: what has happened to the complainant in fact and what would have happened to him without the treatment alleged to have been unfavourable.

The relevant treatment in the present case was the Council’s evaluation as to what deductions should be made in calculating Mr McCue’s available means and what sum it was practicable for Mr McCue to pay.

The Council charges both disabled and non-disabled persons according to the same basic scheme applying s 87. The Council extends this general approach in a way which is more generous to disabled persons to take account of disability related expenditure, being costs over and above those which non-disabled persons must bear. The Council’s approach could not therefore be said to be unfavourable to disabled persons: in fact, it is favourable to them, since it allows for a greater range of possible deductions to be made in calculating their available means. The true nature of the appellant’s complaint was therefore that the treatment of Mr McCue was not generous enough, even though it benefits persons with disabilities; this is not a proper ground of complaint under section 15.

 

Section 20 of the Equality Act: duty to make reasonable adjustments

The appellant needed to show that a provision, criterion or practice of the Council put Mr McCue at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled.

The court was willing to infer that the Council had adopted a practice according to which expenditures are rejected if they do not relate to disability; or if, while relating to disability, a person receives a benefit to meet the cost in question; or if the expenditure represents discretionary spending and is not necessary to meet the disabled person’s needs. The practice did not put a disabled person at a disadvantage in comparison with non-disabled people for the simple reason that the practice only applies to disabled people. It does not allow for any comparison to be made with the treatment of non-disabled persons, so there is no scope for the application of section 20(3).

 

 

For the judgment, please see:

Judgment (PDF)
Judgment on The National Archives (HTML version)
Judgment on BAILII (HTML version)

For the press summary, please see:

Press summary (HTML version)

To watch the hearing, please see:

Watch hearing

18 October 2022
Morning session
Afternoon session

 

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